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Traders’ Incentives and Pricing in the 
New Orleans Slave Market 

CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS AND JONATHAN B. PRITCHETT
We investigate determinants of slave family discounts in the New Orleans 
slave market. We find large price discounts for families unrelated to scale 
effects, childcare costs, legal restrictions, or transport costs. We posit that because 
family members voluntarily cared for each other, sellers sometimes found it 
advantageous to keep families together (when families included needy or 
dependent members). Evidence from ship manifests carrying slaves for sale in 
New Orleans provides direct evidence for selectivity bias in explaining slave 
family discounts. Children likely to have been shipped with their mothers are 
1 to 2 inches shorter than other children.
ince the publication of Robert W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman’s 
Time on the Cross, economic historians have been actively debating 
the validity of one of their central propositions—that slaves were 
allowed, and encouraged, to maintain family ties because doing so 
enhanced the value of slaves to their owners. Laurence Kotlikoff 
investigated the potential effect of family connections on the value of 
slaves sold in the New Orleans market at the time of their sale.1 If 
preserving family ties enhanced the value of slaves to their owners, as 
Fogel and Engerman posited, the value of slave family members sold 
together would be higher. Kotlikoff found that the value of mother-
father-child groups—a rare event in the data—was higher than the 
combined value of the members of the family if they were sold singly. 
However, other family combinations, including mother-child sales—by 
far the most common form of family sale—suffered large discounts 
when compared to the sales of identical family members sold separately. 
 Fogel and Engerman argued that this finding could reflect a scale 
discount associated with slave sales—by selling the slaves as a group 
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rather than singly, the sum of transactions costs would be reduced, or 
equivalently, buyers would realize a scale discount. 2 If the discount 
outweighed the economic benefits associated with family ties, family 
members would sell at a discount rather than a premium. If that 
explanation were correct, it could be confirmed by empirical analysis of 
two questions: (1) Is there a scale discount for selling slaves irrespective 
of whether they are family members or not; and (2) Do slave groups of 
any particular size command higher market prices when the members 
of the group sold are family members (as opposed to unrelated group 
members)? To our knowledge, no one has investigated these questions 
empirically. 
 A related issue is the need to consider the potential effect of 
selectivity bias in the slave sales process. Slaves who are sold are likely 
not a random sample of slaves in the population. In addition, it is 
possible that slave family members sold together are selected for sale 
through a different process than slaves sold individually. If that were 
true, then the family discount observed in the sales of slave family 
groups might reflect differences in the selection process for the sale of 
families compared to the selection process for the sale of individuals. If 
selectivity bias explains the family discount, then observed discounts 
may give a distorted measure of the underlying value (in the broader 
slave population) to masters of keeping slave families together.
 Independent of their owners’ economic interests, families would  
not exist without the active support and participation of the slaves 
themselves. The family served, among other things, as a form of long-
term life insurance against the hardships of slavery. Owners sometimes 
may have benefited from this mutual dependency by selling family 
members together rather than singly. Most obviously, if one member of 
the group were weak or sick, that individual might be sold with another 
member of his family because the joint value of the two would be 
greater than their value if sold separately. This negative selection of 
family groups would produce a family discount, which is simply 
indicative of the lower market price attached to the weak, sick, or needy 
member of the family group.  
Transport costs may have affected the average value of slaves shipped 
in family groups versus the value of slaves shipped singly. When a fixed 
transport cost is applied to two similar goods, the effect is to lower the 
relative price of the higher quality good. Because shipment of slaves was 
costly, the relative price of high-valued slaves was lower in New Orleans, 
and as a consequence, buyers preferred to purchase relatively more 
2 Fogel and Engerman, “Some Notes,” p. 258. 
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of them. Positive selection is likely to have its greatest effect on the 
attributes of children chosen for market—only the healthiest and most 
robust would justify the cost of shipment.3 In deciding whether to ship a 
family to New Orleans, a trader would consider the attributes of the entire 
family, not just those of the children. It is possible that the children 
shipped with families were less rigorously selected than the children 
shipped singly. In addition, it might have been cheaper to ship a child 
with a parent rather than by himself. If that were true, then the selection 
produced by transport costs for the attributes of family members could be 
different from those of individuals.  
 Legal restrictions could also have played a role in producing observed 
price differences between family group members and stand-alone slaves. 
Children under the age of ten could not be legally sold alone unless they 
were orphans. Also, superannuates were legally required to be sold 
jointly with a child (if one were present). If these Louisiana laws were 
enforced, that may have reduced the market value of slaves sold as part of 
family groups.  
 We test these various explanations of group scale discounts, and 
family-ties premia or discounts, using prices for slaves sold in the New 
Orleans market from 1820 through 1860. We distinguish sales of groups 
that include family and nonfamily members, and family group sales  
of different types (those involving small children, and other sales), to 
investigate how family-ties premia or discounts vary with the structure 
of the family sold. Our results from slave price regressions lend support 
to the view that selectivity bias involving family groups, rather than 
economies of scale in selling, explains the observed group discounts.
Absent scale discounts, the fact that family groups sold at discount 
suggests that slave owners benefited from preserving families when those 
family members had relatively low stand-alone market values. Otherwise, 
in the absence of an economic benefit, sellers could have increased their 
profit by separating families at the time of sale. Stated differently, under 
the assumption of zero arbitrage profits, the fact that heavily discounted 
family group sales occurred provides evidence of selectivity bias, which 
reflected the voluntary provision of care among slave family members. 
Slave owners’ decisions not to separate families despite a family discount 
indicated that they perceived that the sum of the stand-alone prices they 
would have received by separating families would have been lower 
than the discounted family group sale price, presumably because of the 
assistance and care that family members voluntarily provided one another.  
3  Alchian and Allen, Exchange and Production, pp. 78–79; Pritchett and Chamberlain, 
“Selection”; and Pritchett and Freudenberger, “Peculiar Sample.” 
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 In the case of family groups involving parent-child relationships,  
one can gauge the potential importance of selectivity bias by examining 
additional data. We examine data from ship manifests on the heights of 
slave children during their transport for sale to the New Orleans slave 
market. We find that children traveling as members of family groups are 
substantially shorter (by roughly two inches) than children of the same 
age and sex that we identify as traveling separately. We argue that  
the taller stature of children shipped without parents provides further 
evidence that some form of selectivity by traders explains the family-
ties discounts observed in the New Orleans slave market. We find that 
transport costs resulted in higher values for imported slaves, but the size 
of group family discounts is unrelated to whether a slave is imported or 
not. We find some evidence for the role of legal restrictions in boosting 
family discounts (after legal changes in 1829), but legal factors cannot 
explain most of our findings.  
MODELING SLAVE PRICES FROM NEW ORLEANS SALES 
 We use the New Orleans Slave Sale Sample, originally collected under 
the direction of Fogel and Engerman, and used previously by Kotlikoff, 
Bruce Greenwald and Robert Glasspiegel, Herman Freudenberger and 
Pritchett, and Eugene Choo and Jean Eid.4 During the first part of the 
nineteenth century, New Orleans was the center of slave trading in the 
South. Transactions included both local slave sales and sales of imported 
slaves, often brought by ship from elsewhere in the South. Because of 
its French legal tradition, slaves in Louisiana were considered real estate 
rather than personal property, and as such, all slave sales had to be 
notarized.5 The Fogel and Engerman slave sale sample was drawn from 
the New Orleans Notarial Archives, which was created in 1867 to serve 
as a depository of the notarial records. These records are not a complete 
set of transactions—some notarial records were destroyed in office fires, 
whereas others were simply lost. Depending on the year of sale, between 
2.5 and 5 percent of the extant notarial records comprise the sample of 
slave sales recorded by Fogel and Engerman.
The sample contains 2,169 usable observations of stand-alone sales of 
slaves, which we define as transactions in which only one slave was sold. 
The data set also contains 683 usable group sale transactions. Recorded 
4  Fogel and Engerman, “New Orleans Slave”; Kotlikoff, “Structure” and “Quantitative 
Description”; Greenwald and Glasspiegel, “Adverse Selection”; Freudenberger and Pritchett, 
“Domestic”; and Choo and Eid, “Interregional Price Difference.” 
5 Louisiana, Acts Passed, p. 101. For a few sales, slave titles were transferred under the 
private signatures and witnessed by a judge, rather than recorded by a public notary.  
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characteristics of the individuals in the group include their age, sex, and 
family relationship (although it is possible that family relationships were 
not always noted). Other data fields include information about the degree 
of skin darkness, whether the transaction was for cash or credit, and 
whether the slaves were sold with a guarantee.6 Prices are normalized, as 
in Kotlikoff, by dividing the observed price by the average price of a 
male, aged 21 to 38 years, sold in that same year. This procedure avoids 
the need to control for price changes over time.7
 Before discussing our approach to modeling the factors that affected 
the pricing of slave groups, it is useful to review some of the differences 
between the samples of stand-alone and group transactions, and the 
frequency of different types of groups. Such information offers important 
hints about potential selectivity in the determination of whether a slave 
was included in a group or stand-alone transaction, or a particular type of 
group transaction. 
 Most obviously, the age distributions are very different for the stand-
alone and group samples. The group sample includes more children, 
especially young ones. Children younger than ten represent 3 percent of 
stand-alones and nearly 29 percent of group sales. Legal restrictions 
may have reduced the number of children under the age of ten years 
sold without their parent. Additional legal restrictions applied to the 
separate sale of weak or sick slaves, who are more frequently elderly.  
In addition, differences in the age distributions may reflect different 
economic advantages from preserving familial relationships for slaves 
of different ages.
 Relatively few intact families were sold in New Orleans and most 
family groups were comprised of mothers with children. Family group 
members accounted for 45 percent of the total number of slaves sold in 
groups. Most family group members (87 percent) consisted of mothers 
and their children, and the most common family group consisted of  
a mother with children (90 percent). Mother-father-child groups were 
rare (only 3.6 percent of the total number of family groups). Other  
adult family affiliations (by which we mean other family groupings in 
which children age 13 and younger were not present) took the form of 
husband-wife pairs and sibling groupings.
 We construct a model of stand-alone slave sales to serve as our 
benchmark for group sales. The stand-alone model can be used to 
generate predicted values for each group sale by adding together the 
6 According to the law, slaves were sold with an implied guarantee against “physical or 
moral defects,” unless the contract specifically limited that guarantee. So-called moral defects 
included drunkenness or the propensity to attempt escape. 
7 Kotlikoff, “Structure” and “Quantitative Description.” 
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predicted values of each group member to create a composite predicted 
value for the group. 8 We then predict group discounts or premia, 
defined as the logarithm of the difference of the actual and predicted 
group price, using the characteristics of the group.
First, we estimate a stand-alone model that regresses observed stand-
alone prices on a variety of slave characteristics. This model is a 
modification of Kotlikoff’s pricing model, which includes the regressors 
listed in Table 1. The most important difference between our stand-
alone model and Kotlikoff’s model arises because we apply the 
Kotlikoff model only to stand-alone transactions. Kotlikoff included 
mother-child transactions in his model, while we model them separately 
in our group transactions analysis. In other respects, however, our 
model is very close to Kotlikoff’s. We experimented with a variety of 
alternative specifications for the age-sex distribution and found that 
none of them substantially improved the fit of the stand-alone model. In 
response to a suggestion from Engerman, we added indicator variables 
that capture whether slave buyers or slaves were from New Orleans. We 
found that this addition improved the fit of both the stand-alone and 
group regression models, but does not affect other results. 
 Table 1 reports the estimation results for our stand-alone version  
of the Kotlikoff model. The results are familiar. Males are worth  
more. Light skin adds some market value for females, but not for males. 
Guarantees raise prices. Transactions that involve credit require higher 
prices. The effect of age is estimated by a six-order polynomial. The 
prices of men and women peak in their early 20s, and values drop 
dramatically in the late 30s and 40s. The residuals from the stand- 
alone regression are similar across the range of slave ages in the sample. 
In particular—and importantly for our discussion below of group sales 
regressions—the regression does not over predict the prices of stand-
alone children or superannuates. 
GROUP SALES REGRESSIONS 
 We turn now to the group sales regressions. The dependent variable 
is the “group premium,” defined as the logarithm of the difference 
between the actual group price and the sum of the predicted stand- 
alone prices for the group members, using the coefficients from Table  
1 to generate predicted prices for each group member. We investigate 
the effects of several potential influences in producing predictable
8  We adjust the predicted values to account for the lognormal variance. See Greene, 
Econometric Analysis, p. 299. 
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TABLE 1 
NEW ORLEANS SLAVE PRICE STRUCTURE, INDIVIDUAL SALES 






Slave price relative to prime-aged male    0.799 
(0.318) 
Intercept  –2.381 
(0.144) 
 1.000 


































Occupation other than artisan or household work  









































group premia or discounts. We present weighted least squares results, 
weighted by group size, in Table 2. Larger groups should have smaller 
group error terms because of the law of large numbers. We find, indeed, 
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Age in years 0.190* 
(0.038) 
        24.34 
      (10.23) 
Age2 · 10-2 –0.542 
(0.427) 
          6.97 
        (6.07) 
Age3 · 10-3 –0.037 
(0.225) 
         22.99 
       (31.88) 
Age4 · 10-4 0.004 
(0.060) 
         85.42 
     (169.39) 
Age5 · 10-5 –0.0017 
(0.0076) 
       349.43 
     (937.78) 
Age6 · 10-6 –0.00015 
(0.00037)
     1544.27 
   (5443.40) 
Buyer from New Orleans (1 = yes, 0 = no) –0.108* 
(0.029) 
   0.780 
  (0.414) 
Slave from New Orleans (1 = yes, 0 = no) –0.050 
(0.031) 
   0.708 
  (0.455) 
Buyer and slave from New Orleans (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.072* 
(0.036) 
   0.580 
  (0.494) 
Adjusted R2 0.484   
Number of observations                         2169 
*indicates the regression coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level. 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the slave’s price relative to the average annual 
price of a male slave, aged 21 to 38 years. Sample includes New Orleans slaves sold singly. The 
omitted variable refers to unguaranteed dark-colored females, without a reported skill, sold for 
cash in September. Standard errors are listed in parentheses beneath regression coefficients. 
Source: Fogel and Engerman, “New Orleans Slave.” 
that larger groups have smaller error terms. We also ran regressions 
using heteroskedasticity correction to control for differences in errors 
across groups, and found very similar results. Also, ordinary least 
squares regressions (not reported here) are qualitatively very similar to 
the results in Table 2. 
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Scale and Group Discounts 
 Fogel and Engerman hypothesized that the size of the group sold  
may lead to differences in pricing if larger transactions enjoy scale 
discounts.9 We investigate this hypothesis by dividing our group sample 
into three groups by size: groups of two people, groups of three-five 
people, and groups of more than five people. Finer divisions of the 
sample, or alternative specifications of size effects yield similar results 
to those reported in Table 2 and are not reported here.
 Equation 2, located in Table 2, provides the simplest version of a 
regression testing for scale effects in the group premium. Groups of  
two people are contained in the intercept, and indicator variables  
are included for group sizes of three to five and over five. The  
three coefficient estimates indicate that statistically significant group 
discounts averaging 7.5 percent are present for groups of two people; 
for groups of three-five people, discounts average 11.2 percent and are 
statistically significant; and groups of more than five people display a 
3.8 percent average discount, which is not statistically different from 
zero at the 10 percent significance level. Equation 2, therefore, suggests 
the opposite of a scale discount for group sales, since larger groups 
command a lower discount. 
 Once one controls for the family and age structure of groups, the 
scale premium observed in equation 2 disappears. Equation 3 adds the 
percentage of group members that are related as family members to the 
group size indicators, and equations 4 and 5 add variables that capture 
the structure of family and nonfamily groups.10 When these variables 
are added, the intercept and the two group size indicator variables 
become small and are no longer statistically significant.  
Families, Group Structure, and Group Discounts 
 The specific structure of the family group is crucial for understanding 
the size of the family discount. The estimated coefficients for children 
sold in family groups are large, negative, and range between –0.38 and  
–0.45. The coefficient of –0.376 for the percent of related children  
aged 0 to 10 implies that the discount for a four-person family group 
with two parents and two young children under 10 was 0.188, which is 
derived by multiplying the 0.5 share of related children under age ten by 
9 “Some Notes.”
10 Both related and unrelated individuals were sometimes sold together. Consequently, we 
indicate the presence of related individuals in the group as a percentage of the total group size 
rather than use a simple dummy variable.  
Preserving Slave Families for Profit 997 
the coefficient of 0.376. This discount is consistent with the earlier 
findings of Kotlikoff and Fogel and Engerman, which they interpreted 
incorrectly as a scale effect.11
Interpretations of the coefficients for the shares of unrelated children 
of different age groups are clouded by the possibility that some sales 
records may not have accurately recorded all parent-child affiliations. 
The results in Table 2 show that there were discounts for unrelated 
children in the group, but this may be due to measurement error. Suppose 
that the presence of unrelated children had no effect on the size of the 
group discount. If the effect of kids related to parents in the group is 
negative, and if many children that are coded as unrelated are really 
related to a parent in the group, that could lead us to observe a negative 
coefficient for the unrelated children share. In that case, the coefficient 
for the unrelated children would be less negative than the one for related 
children, which is precisely what we find in equation 4. The coefficient 
on unrelated children ages 0–10 is –0.193, is statistically significant, and 
is half the magnitude of the coefficient on related children of the same 
age. Similarly, the coefficient on unaffiliated children ages 11–13 is 
–0.123 and much smaller than the analogous coefficient for related 
children (–0.452), although it is not statistically significant. One 
interpretation of these results is that many of the children under the age of 
11 that were not recognized in the written record of the transaction as 
affiliated were in fact affiliated, but that this was less likely for children 
of ages 11–13. 
 Should one interpret discounts associated with children as reflecting 
childcare costs? We believe that would not be a proper interpretation  
of these coefficients, for three reasons. First, observed family discounts 
were not just on infants or toddlers (those with the highest childcare 
costs), but are present for children ranging up to 13 years of age,  
and these discounts are roughly identical for children of all ages within 
that range; in fact, the estimated discounts are most negative for the  
11–13 age range. Second, young children sold on a stand-alone basis 
also required significant childcare from someone, and thus some 
discount for childcare costs should have been priced into all child  
sales, irrespective of whether children were sold on a stand-alone  
basis or with a relative. Third, as we explore more fully below, family  
group sales other than those involving parent-children groupings also  
display large group discounts, which could not possibly reflect childcare
costs. This suggests a more general explanation for family discounts 
that would apply to discounts associated with children as well as other 
11 Kotlikoff, “Structure,” p. 513; and Fogel and Engerman, “Some Notes,” p. 258. 
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family members. The most obvious explanation, which we confirm  
with additional evidence below, is selectivity bias related to the value  
of preserving the voluntary provision of care among family members. 
Children not sold in family groups (a relatively infrequent event) may 
have been exceptional in their level of physical, emotional, or mental 
maturity.  
 Only 12 groups in our sample contain a nuclear family of mother, 
father, and at least one child. The total premium effect for the nuclear 
family is measured as the coefficient on the nuclear family variable plus 
the share of children in each age group times the coefficient for that 
agent group. For example, a family of three sold together, comprised  
of a father, mother, and a 10-year-old girl, would show the following 
total group premium effect: (0.13) + (0.33)(–0.37). While the nuclear 
family coefficient itself is positive, of a reasonably high magnitude,  
and statistically significant, the total group premium effect for a group 
consisting of a father, mother, and 10-year-old girl is essentially zero. 
We interpret this zero effect as the sum of a negative effect from 
selectivity bias associated with any family group containing children 
and a positive offsetting effect, which could either reflect Fogel and 
Engerman’s hypothesized value creation from preserving the nuclear 
family or an alternative form of selectivity bias attached to the sale of 
nuclear families.  
 In cases where there were close family relationships not related  
to children (captured by the regressor Percent Other Family), sales  
of siblings or sales of husband and wife, the coefficient is a statistically 
significant –0.22. We believe that selectivity bias in the sales of these 
closely related adult family members remains a likely explanation of 
our findings—in other words, a married couple, or a sibling pair, were 
more likely to be sold together if one of them was of lower value than 
the corresponding stand-alone slave sold.
Group prices with individuals over the age of 50 in family groups 
were strongly discounted. For example, the sale price of a man and his 
wife both aged greater than 50 was discounted an additional 74 percent 
compared to a man and wife both under age 50. An interpretation of 
this finding is that the value of relatively weak older individuals was 
especially reduced by being sold in groups, perhaps because those 
individuals were especially vulnerable to injury or infirmity. Interestingly, 
and consistent with either positive or negative selectivity, the coefficient 
on unaffiliated older people is small and not statistically significant, 
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indicating that family connections were essential for observing discounts 
on older individuals in groups.12
 As a robustness check, because few young children were sold singly, 
we examined the subset of slave groups that consisted entirely of 
individuals older than ten years of age. Our findings for this subsample 
are the same as for the full sample: there are no scale discounts, and 
family discounts remain large and statistically significant.13
Transport Costs as a Potential Source of Selectivity Bias 
 For interregional traders, economic profit equaled the difference 
between the slave’s expected price in the delivered market and the sum 
of transport cost and the slave’s purchase price in the exporting area. 
Because children commanded relatively low market prices, traders may 
have found that they were less profitable for shipment than other, more 
valuable, slaves. Consistent with this prediction, relatively few children 
were imported and sold in New Orleans. Children aged 10 years or  
less comprised only 10 percent of all imported slaves, whereas children 
comprised 18 percent of the local slaves (or those of unknown origin). 
Not only were relatively few imported children sold in New Orleans, 
many were sold without their mothers. Among children aged 10 years 
or less, 32 percent of the imported slaves were sold without their 
mothers, whereas only 24 percent of the local slaves were sold without 
their mothers. In addition, because mother-child pairings were the  
most common family group, the paucity of imported children helps to 
account for the lack of family groups among imported slaves. Only 16 
percent of imported slaves were sold in family groups, whereas nearly 
29 percent of local slaves were sold in families. Finally, relatively few 
imported females, aged 20 to 24 years, were sold with a child compared 
to females of local or unknown origin.14 Traders selected relatively  
few children for shipment to New Orleans, and in many cases, these 
children were sold without their mothers.  
 Transportation costs also could have affected the magnitude of the 
family group discounts. For example, traders may have more rigorously 
12 According to Ulrich B. Phillips, an elderly slave was “worth substantially less than nothing, 
for he would render no service and his master must maintain him indefinitely on a pensioner’s 
dole.” As evidence, he cites the example of a buyer offering a higher price for a group of slaves 
if the seller would retain ten superannuated slaves rather than include them in the sale. An 
owner, who was obligated to provide care for unproductive slaves, might bundle them with 
more valuable slaves and offer the group at a discounted price. Phillips, Life and Labor, p. 175. 
13 These regression results are available from the authors on request. 
14 The fact that so many slaves were sold without other family members has been viewed as 
an indication of selectivity in the sales process. See Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross, p. 
49; and Tadman, Speculators, p. 152. 
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selected single individuals for transport to New Orleans as compared  
to those slaves who were shipped as part of a family. If this effect  
were important, then even if the familial care motive did not apply, 
group sales could have displayed discounts relative to stand-alone sales 
for imported slaves but not necessarily for local slaves.  
 In equation 6 of Table 2, we investigate whether observed family 
discounts differ depending on the slave’s region of origin. If transport 
costs, rather than familial care motives, were the source of family 
discounts, then family discounts would have been greater for imported 
slaves. Because of sample size limitations, we do not differentiate 
between children of different ages. We find no evidence that transport 
cost selectivity caused family discounts. Children imported as members 
of groups do not display greater discounts than local children sold as 
members of groups. In fact, for unrelated children sold in groups, 
estimated discounts are lower for imports than for locals, although the 
difference between locals and imports is not statistically significant.  
 Legal Restrictions vs. Family Preferences 
 Laws prohibited the division of some family groups into their 
component parts. There were two sets of relevant legal restrictions. First, 
with respect to children, according to the Louisiana Black Code, passed 
in 1806 and enhanced with stiff penalties for violation in 1829, children 
under the age of ten could not be sold separately from their mothers 
unless they were orphans. Second, with respect to older people, Section 
8 of the Black Code states that: “. . . if at a public sale of slaves, there 
happen to be some who be disabled through old age or otherwise, and 
who have children, such slaves shall not be sold but with such of his 
children whom he or she may think proper to go with.”15 In addition, 
many states prohibited the emancipation of elderly slaves as a means of 
preventing masters from abandoning older slaves who were injured or 
sick in an attempt to get the public to care for them as paupers.16
 The limitation on the separate sale of children under the age of  
ten had an effect on the presence of stand-alone sales of slave children. 
Table 3 reports data on the relative number of children sold without 
their mothers both before and after the imposition of penalties in 1829 
15 Louisiana, Acts Passed, p. 154. 
16 Virginia outlawed the manumission of unsupported slaves aged 45 years and older in 1782. 
The law was upheld in 1824 and 1848; Louisiana joined other Southern states in outlawing 
manumission in 1857, after a rise in emancipations throughout the 1850s. See Savitt, Medicine,
p. 203; Schafer, Becoming Free, p. 2; and Klebaner, “American Manumission Laws.”
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TABLE 3
EFFECT OF 1829 BLACK CODE PENALTIES ON FREQUENCY OF CHILDREN SOLD 
ON STAND-ALONE BASIS AS “ORPHANS” 
The Sale of Orphans in New Orleans, 1810 to 1859 
Time Period 
Slaves Under 10 Years of Age Sold 
Separately as Percentage of Slaves 
Sold with Mother and Those Sold 
Without Mothers 
Slaves 10 to 12 Years of Age Sold 
Separately as Percentage of Slaves 
Sold with Mother and Those Sold 
Without Mothers 
1810–1819 13.5 69.7 
1820–1829 14.9 78.0 
1830–1839 8.3 70.5 
1840–1849 9.8 74.3 
1850–1859 5.3 63.6 
Notes: The Fogel and Engerman sample includes the records of 1,145 children, 0 to 12 years of 
age (aged under 13 years). We can classify these children three ways: (1) 225 children sold 
singly, (2) 721 children sold with their mothers, and (3) 199 children sold in a group but without 
an identified mother. For this latter group, 126 children were not sold with a woman, aged 15 
years or more—in other words, without a potential mother. In addition, two more children were 
classified as orphans. We assume that these 128 children were not sold with their mothers, 
leaving 71 children who might have been sold with their mother. We assume that these 71 
children were sold with their mothers. 
Source: Fogel and Engerman, “New Orleans Slave.” 
for falsely identifying children as orphans. Prior to the law’s passage, 
approximately 14 percent of young children were sold as orphans 
whereas after 1829, only 7 percent were sold without their mothers. It is 
evident from these data that behavior changed after 1829, and this may 
be related to the new penalties.17
Presumably, the intent of the Louisiana laws was to encourage  
the preservation of more families than was otherwise profitable to  
preserve. If the 1829 law was (at least partially) effective in preventing 
the profitable separation of some mothers and children, then the 
combined value of the mother-child groups would have been reduced by 
the law relative to their stand-alone values. Consequently, an effective 
legal restriction on the separate sale of family members might account for 
the observed family discount. Donald Sweig argues that slave traders 
preferred to sell mother-child groups particularly after the passage of the 
1829 law.18 If traders less rigorously selected these groups, then the sum 
17 We test this proposition by combining the first two time periods and the last three and 
performing a simple Chi-square test. Children aged less than 10 years were significantly less 
likely to be sold separately after 1829. (Chi-square equals 8.67 (1) – significant at 0.003 level.) 
For those children aged 10 years or more, there was no significant change. (Chi-square equals 
0.908 (1) – significant at .34 level.) Court cases involving the enforcement of the 1829 act 
typically concerned a buyer attempting to claim ownership of an underage child after the 
separate purchase of the child’s mother. See Schafer, Slavery, pp. 165–68.  
18 Sweig, “Reassessing,” p. 11. 
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of their stand-alone values would have been reduced, thus accounting for 
the observed family discount.  
 This price effect could have been mitigated by arbitrage. Legal 
restrictions might have created a profit opportunity for sellers who were 
willing and able to evade them. For example, after buying a mother-
child pair at a reduced price, a trader might sell them singly in New 
Orleans, thus reaping a capital gain. To the extent that owners could 
break the law with impunity, then the effective protection provided to 
slave families, as well as the magnitude of the observed family discount, 
would have been reduced. When we allow the discount for related and 
unrelated children to change in magnitude after 1829 in specification  
7, the results indicate that the 1829 law increased the family discount 
associated with the presence of young children in family groups. The 
coefficients are larger for groups with young children whether they are 
identified as family members or not, which further supports the view 
that affiliated children may have been frequently misidentified as 
unaffiliated.  
DATA FROM SHIP MANIFESTS 
If selectivity bias explains group discounts on slave sales, that implies 
that the characteristics of stand-alone slaves sold have superior value on 
average to those of family-related slaves sold in groups with the same set 
of characteristics observed in our slave sales database. An ideal test of 
that proposition would require measuring, for stand-alone and family-
affiliated slaves sold in the New Orleans market, relevant observable 
characteristics that are not included in the slave sales database but that 
would have been observable to the market.  
 Height would be one such measure. Taller slaves were assessed at 
higher prices.19 Heights were not recorded in the slave sales database, 
but ship manifests did record heights for slaves that were shipped to  
the New Orleans market by slave traders from other parts of the 
South. 20  Unfortunately, family affiliations were not recorded in the  
ship manifests. Nevertheless, we have devised a method for inferring 
19 Margo and Steckel, “Heights,” p. 531. 
20 In the following, we demonstrate that traders selected slaves for shipment in family groups 
using observable characteristics that were not recorded on the sale invoices. Because traders may 
have separated families after debarkation, the families sold in New Orleans, and the corresponding 
statures of the family members, may have differed from those listed on the coastwise manifests. 
While it is certainly possible that some slaves shipped as families were later separated prior to sale, 
it is reasonable to assume that the family groups sold in New Orleans were also shipped as a group. 
The fact that we observe both group family discounts and lower heights for children shipped with 
their mothers corroborates that assumption. 
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(probabilistically) whether or not a child listed on a ship manifest was 
traveling with his or her mother on the ship.
 The coastwise manifests were mandated by Congress in an effort  
to prevent the smuggling of foreign slaves into the United States.  
The Abolition Act of 1807 provided for the coastwise transportation of 
domestic slaves by requiring duplicate manifests for each shipment of 
slaves. Each manifest lists slaves by (first) name, along with their age, 
sex, color, and stature, and the names and residences of the shippers. 
The outward manifest was deposited at the port of embarkation, 
whereas the inward manifest was deposited at the port of debarkation. 
We use Richard Steckel’s sample of 903 inward coastwise manifests for 
the port of New Orleans. These manifests list a total of 13,147 slaves.
 The coastwise manifests include the records of slave traders and 
other shippers to New Orleans. In order to identify the manifests 
belonging to slave traders, Pritchett and Freudenberger compared the 
names of the shippers listed on the manifests with those of people who 
sold slaves in New Orleans during the same year. The New Orleans 
Conveyance Office, which was established by state law in 1827, 
alphabetized the names of vendors in the city. After consulting 
approximately 80 volumes in the Conveyance Office, Pritchett and 
Freudenberger identified 201 manifests and a total of 6,418 slaves where 
the shipper was a New Orleans slave trader.21
 We use the order of the slaves listed on the manifests to identify 
likely family (mother and child) relationships. By convention, children 
who were shipped with their mothers were listed directly below their 
mothers on the manifests. 22  We infer family status by the presence  
of a female of childbearing age immediately followed by a child. To  
be specific, we classify all female slaves, aged 15 years or more, as 
potential mothers. If she is immediately followed on the manifest by a 
slave who is 15 to 44 years younger than herself, we identify the slave 
as her child. Because some mothers were shipped with more than one 
child, we follow a similar procedure for the next slave listed on the 
manifest—if the immediate preceding slave is identified as having a 
mother, and the slave is between 15 and 44 years younger than the 
potential mother, we identify the slave as her child. We continue this 
procedure, allowing for a maximum number of eight children being 
shipped with one particular mother. 
 Our sample includes the records of 910 children, aged 4 to 13 years, 
listed on the manifests of identified New Orleans slave traders. Using 
21 Pritchett and Freudenberger, “Peculiar Sample,” p. 115. Because we include the manifests 
of shipments prior to 1827, our sample is slightly larger than theirs. 
22 Sweig, “Reassessing the Human Dimension,” p. 8. 
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the method described previously, we estimate that 675 children, or  
74 percent of the children shipped by traders, were not shipped with 
their mothers. The prevalence of these unaffiliated children varied by 
age. For young children, aged 4 or 5 years, less than 25 percent were 
identified as orphans. For children aged 10 to 13 years, however, over 
88 percent were shipped without their mothers. Interestingly, a similar 
pattern is also found for the children sold in New Orleans—less than  
8 percent of young children, aged 4 or 5 years, were sold without  
their mothers. In contrast, over 75 percent of the children aged 10 to 13  
years were unaffiliated. For both samples, older children were much 
more likely to be unaffiliated than the younger children. The similarity 
between these two samples adds credence to our method for identifying 
children shipped with their mothers.  
HEIGHTS REGRESSIONS MEASURING SELECTIVITY BIAS 
 In Table 4, we report regression results that compare the heights of 
children that we identify as affiliated with a mother versus those that are 
not affiliated, controlling for age and sex. The first regression indicates 
that the children that we identify as (likely to have been) shipped with 
their mothers are 1.26 inches shorter than children of the same sex  
and age who are unaffiliated. The second regression in Table 4  
interacts the “shipped with mother” effect on height with age indicators 
for children in two age groups: (1) children aged four to ten years, and 
(2) children aged more than 10 years. We find that for children aged ten 
years or less, the estimated height shortfall of affiliated children is 
roughly 1.47 inches. The estimated height shortfall for older affiliated 
children is 0.78 inches, although imprecisely estimated. Therefore, the 
results are consistent with the selectivity-bias hypothesis that children 
shipped to New Orleans for sale with their mothers were shorter and 
thus less valuable than children shipped without their mothers. The 
estimated effect is stronger for young children, although the difference 
between younger and older children is not robustly statistically 
significant. This finding lends support to the selectivity bias hypothesis 
for explaining the observed discounts associated with children in family 
groups, reported in Table 2. 
 As shown in Table 2, the magnitude of the family group discount 
associated with the sale of young children increased after 1829, when  
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TABLE 4 
HEIGHTS OF CHILDREN, AGED 4 TO 13 YEARS, SHIPPED BY NEW ORLEANS SLAVE 
TRADERS ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION RESULTS
Covariate (1) (2) (3)

























































































Shipped with mother  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 
–1.26* 
(0.31) 
    0.258 
(0.438) 
Shipped with mother and aged 4  
to 10 years (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
  –1.47* 
(0.37) 
  0.207 
(0.405) 
Shipped with mother and older  
than 10 years (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
  –0.78 
(0.55) 
  0.052 
(0.221) 
Shipped prior to April 1829, with 
mother, and aged 4 to 10 years  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 




Shipped prior to April 1829, with 
mother, and older than 10 years  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 




Shipped after April 1829, with  
mother, and aged 4 to 10 years  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 




Shipped after April 1829, with  
mother, and older than 10 years  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 




Number of children 910  910  910  910 
Adjusted R2 0.730  0.730 0.731   
* indicates the covariate is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the height of slaves in inches. The omitted variable represents a 
female slave, aged four years, shipped without her mother. Regression results for interactions of 
age and male indicator variables are not reported. Sample includes 120 manifests of slave traders 
identified from the New Orleans Conveyance Records. For the identification of children sold with 
mothers, see the text. Standard errors are listed in parentheses beneath regression coefficients.  
Source: Inward coastwise manifests, New Orleans, LA. 
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Louisiana law required all children under age 10 to be sold with their 
mothers. The third regression in Table 4 shows that the average heights 
of children traveling with their mothers after the passage of the 1829 
law were lower, consistent with the increased price discount found in 
Table 2.
 In Table 5, we report additional results including manifests for ships 
unrelated to the slave trade. These data serve two purposes. First, they 
provide a control group to test whether height differences measured  
in Table 4 between affiliated and unaffiliated children being sold can  
be properly attributed to the effects of selectivity bias in the sale of 
affiliated children sold with their mothers relative to stand-alone slave 
sales. If the same result were observed in manifest data unrelated to  
the slave trade, then that would suggest some other causal factor for  
this difference unrelated to selectivity bias in slave sales. Table 5  
shows that the “shipped with mother effect,” per se, is zero. The 
covariate omitted from the regression equations refers to children 
shipped by non-traders and without an identified mother. As indicated 
by the regression coefficient for “Shipped with mother,” the heights of 
child slaves traveling on non-slave trader ships had similar heights 
irrespective of whether they were traveling with their mothers. In  
this larger sample, the indicator variables associated with slave trader 
vessels continue to show greater heights for children traveling without 
their mothers, especially for those under the age of 10 years. 
 A second purpose for analyzing height data from manifests is to 
compare the slave heights on slave traders’ vessels with those traveling 
in the general population. Here the key finding is that slave children 
traveling on slave traders’ ships, whether with their mothers or alone, 
were taller on average than slave children traveling on non-slave trader 
vessels. The magnitudes of the height differences for both child groups 
traveling on slave traders’ vessels are large and statistically significant 
for slave children under the age of 10, although the magnitude of  
the effect is smaller and not statistically significant for children older  
than 10 who are traveling on a slave trader’s ship with their mothers. 
We interpret this as evidence in favor of positive selectivity related to 
transportation cost, which caused the heights even of affiliated children 
en route for sale in New Orleans to be greater than the mean of the 
general population (as proxied by the average of children’s heights from 
the non-slave trader manifests).  
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TABLE 5 
HEIGHTS OF CHILDREN, AGED 4 TO 13 YEARS, SHIPPED BY TRADERS AND NON-
TRADERS, REGRESSION RESULTS 
Covariate (1) (2) (3)

























































































Shipped with mother and not by a trader  









Shipped by trader and without mother  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 
1.74* 
(0.24) 
  0.434 
(0.496) 
Shipped by trader and with mother  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 
0.74* 
(0.33) 
  0.151 
(0.358) 
Shipped by trader, without mother,  







Shipped by slave trader, without mother,  







Shipped by trader, with mother and aged 4 





Shipped by trader, with mother and older  





Shipped by trader prior to April 1829,  
with mother and aged 4 to 10 years  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 




Shipped by trader prior to April 1829,  
with mother and older than 10 years  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 
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TABLE 5 — continued  
Covariate (1) (2) (3)
 Mean and 
Std. Dev. 
Shipped by trader after April 1829,  
with mother and aged 4 to 10 years  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 




Shipped by trader after April 1829,  
with mother and older than 10 years  
(1 = yes, 0 = no) 




Number of children 1557 1557 1557 1557 
Adjusted R2 0.707 0.708 0.708  
* indicates the covariate is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the height of slaves in inches. The omitted variable represents a 
female slave, aged four years, shipped without her mother by someone other than a slave trader. 
Regression results for interactions of age and male indicator variables are not reported. Sample 
includes 274 manifests, slave traders identified from the New Orleans Conveyance Records. 
For the identification of children sold with mothers, see the text. Standard errors are listed in 
parentheses beneath regression coefficients. 
Source: Inward coastwise manifests, New Orleans, LA. 
Finally, we estimate the average heights of children traveling with their 
mothers (and shipped by slave traders) both before and after the passage 
of the 1829 law. Earlier, we found the increased legal protection of the 
mother-child relationship was associated with a decrease in the average 
height of children in such groups. In the third regression of Table 5, the 
affiliated children shipped by slave traders again were taller prior to the 
passage of this law. In contrast, the affiliated children shipped by traders 
after 1829 were on average only slightly taller (approximately .3 inches) 
than the children shipped by non-traders and the height difference was 
not statistically significant. The similarity in the heights of these affiliated 
children suggests that after the passage of this law, traders did not 
rigorously select these family groups and that only the children shipped 
separately were unusually tall for their age. 
CONCLUSION 
 The existence of price discounts for slave families, when compared to 
stand-alone sales of slaves, has been known for some time.23 Previous
research attributes this price discount to a reduction in transaction costs 
associated with group sales. We find, however, no evidence of scale 
discounts for unrelated slaves. Families, rather than groups, account for 
the presence of price discounts.
23 Kotlikoff, “Quantitative Description.”  
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 Absent selectivity bias, slaves sold in family groups should have 
commanded higher prices. Fogel and Engerman argue that owners 
received economic value from maintaining families, which should  
have created a price premium rather than a price discount. Our primary 
explanation for the observed price discount for family groups, based on 
unobserved heterogeneity, suggests that the family members, if sold 
singly, would have commanded lower market prices than the unrelated 
slaves who were not sold in family groups. If the members of intact 
families had less valuable unobserved characteristics (such as shorter 
stature or poor health), this could explain why the group price is lower 
on average than the sum of the predicted prices for the individual family 
members when sold singly.  
 In order to test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, we 
searched for additional evidence that slaves sold in family groups were 
adversely selected. The coastwise manifests list the heights of slaves 
intended for sale in New Orleans. By comparing the heights of slaves 
(we infer were) shipped in family groups with those of slaves shipped 
separately, we demonstrate that children shipped with their mothers had 
shorter stature on average than children shipped singly. Because height 
is correlated with market value, the shorter stature of family slaves may 
account for the observed price discount observed for families.  
 The empirical literature on slave family discounts began with Fogel 
and Engerman’s hypothesis that slave family sales should entail a 
premium, owing to the value of maintaining family ties, which they 
argued would be reflected in the values of slaves to their masters.24
While our article does find some limited support for the existence of  
a nuclear family premium, ironically, we think our evidence of more 
general family discounts may provide stronger evidence of a positive 
price effect from preserving family ties. In our view, family discounts 
reflect the fact that the market attaches value to keeping some families 
together, especially in circumstances where one family member is  
weak or needy. That market decision itself depended on preexisting 
slave family preferences for family ties, which were only selectively 
permitted by the market.  
24 Fogel and Engerman, Time on the Cross.
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